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Editors’Summary
The brookings panel on Economic Activity held its seventy-seventh
conference in Washington, D.C., on March 25 and 26, 2004. This issue of
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity includes the papers and discus-
sions presented at the conference. The ﬁrst paper analyzes the experience
of single mothers since the welfare reforms of the mid-1990s. The second
paper offers a diagnosis of the persistence of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa
and outlines a long-run program of assistance to promote sustained devel-
opment. The third paper models the relationship between long-run demo-
graphic swings and long-run returns to equities. The fourth paper reports
on a survey of Americans’opinions on, and knowledge about, economic
policy issues and assesses how self-interest, political ideology, and other
factors relate to those opinions. 
The change in the political climate in the United States during the
1980s placed the nation’s welfare system under increasing attack, and after
caseloads began to grow rapidly in the early 1990s, recalling an earlier
surge in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Democrats as well as Republi-
cans supported reform. In 1996, with the support of President Bill Clinton,
Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act of 1996. This legislation replaced the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program with a new program called Tem-
porary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Since its inception as part
of the Social Security Act in 1935, AFDC had been the federal govern-
ment’s main welfare program, providing assistance to low-income single
mothers. TANF continued this assistance but mandated nationwide time
limits on welfare receipt and work requirements for recipients—popular
features that some states had introduced earlier under federal waivers. At
the same time, the new law reduced federal control over welfare policy.
Federal matching of state expenditures on AFDC was replaced with ﬁxed
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grants were used. 
The 1996 reform is widely regarded as successful. Welfare participation
among single mothers has dropped from 25 percent in 1996 to 9 percent in
2002, and the fraction working has increased from 74 percent to 79 per-
cent. But there is as yet no agreement on what features of the reform
deserve the most credit, or on the extent to which its success reflects the
extraordinary growth in output and employment that the economy enjoyed
for several years after the reforms were passed. In the first article of this
issue, Hanming Fang and Michael Keane address these issues, using
detailed information on the behavior of a large sample of single mothers
and exploiting the signiﬁcant differences among states and over time in the
salient features of welfare policies.
A signiﬁcant literature on these issues has developed in the eight years
since welfare reform was enacted. The authors provide an extensive criti-
cal review of this literature, highlighting differences between their own
approach and those of previous studies. The aspect of the 1996 reform that
has received the greatest attention is the elimination of the entitlement
status of welfare, in particular the imposition of time limits on welfare
receipt. But a broad range of other factors may also have influenced the
welfare and work decisions of single mothers, including other features of
the reform itself (such as work requirements), other policy changes (such
as the expansion of Medicaid eligibility and the earned income tax credit,
or EITC), and the strong macroeconomic environment. Most studies have
focused on one or a few of these policy and economic variables and thus
might have misattributed the observed improvement in outcomes to the
feature or features being examined, when the change was really due to
other, omitted factors. The authors discuss at length the pitfalls in the
widely used difference-in-differences methodology, which compares
behavioral changes in a group subject to a policy change with behavioral
changes in other groups not subject to the change. They also note several
anomalous or disconcerting results in studies that have used other
approaches. Many studies, moreover, do not explain the rise in caseloads
before reform, leaving open whether a reversal of unidentified factors
responsible for the rise may have contributed to the later decline. An analy-
sis by the Council of Economic Advisers, for example, leaves unexplained
fully 70 percent of the rise of caseloads from 1989 to 1993 and attributes
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ﬁed factors.” 
The authors make two general observations about the studies they
review. First, all of the studies use only dummy variables (indicating, for
example, whether or not a state has implemented a time limit) rather than
more precise measures to capture policy effects. The authors suggest that
the effects of time limits and other policy changes are likely to build
through time, working mostly by affecting the rates of entry into or exit
from welfare. To allow for such effects, in their own analysis they include
measures of the time elapsed since a policy was implemented. Second, all
of the previous studies include state dummy variables to control for dif-
ferences in welfare and work participation across states that the model oth-
erwise leaves unexplained. The authors note that this use of state fixed
effects can lead to seriously biased estimates of policy effects in a dynamic
model. For example, suppose that single mothers’decisions about whether
to work or go on welfare depend on their impressions of the generosity of
their state’s program, but that the women ignore fluctuations in welfare
benefits in forming their impressions. Then an analysis using state fixed
effects, which capture differences in mean beneﬁt levels across states, may
lead to underestimates of the effect of beneﬁts. On the other hand, in some
circumstances, using state fixed effects can improve the precision of esti-
mates of policy effects, for example when they absorb the effects of
unmeasured factors affecting welfare participation that differ on average
across states and are independent of policy variables. They can also protect
against attributing the effects of such unmeasured factors to correlated dif-
ferences in the average level of policy variables across states. The authors
are not greatly concerned with the first consideration, since their models
do a good job of explaining the persistent differences in welfare and work
participation across states. 
A major advantage of this paper over previous work is its combination
of data on individuals from the Census Bureau’s Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS) with a more articulated description of economic and policy vari-
ables. Focusing on households headed by single mothers, the authors use
the CPS to provide demographic information—including age, race, edu-
cation, marital status, and number and ages of children—about every
member of the household and to construct measures of welfare and work
participation. They collect detailed information about states’policies from
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programs that appear the same on the surface in fact differ in essential
respects. For example, although the 1996 welfare law prohibits states from
using federal funds to provide benefits to adults for more than five years,
the actual time limit in a given state can be less or more than five years,
because some states set a shorter limit whereas others use their own funds
to provide benefits beyond the federal limit. Among the latter, Michigan,
New York, and Vermont have no effective time limit, and six other states
continue to provide the child portion of the benefit when the limit is
exceeded. These and other differences across state programs are key
sources of variation that help identify the effects of policy on welfare and
work participation. 
The authors collect such information on all the major features of states’
welfare policies. The listing of these features in an appendix to the paper
conveys the magnitude of this task. The authors examine, state by state and
year by year, data on work requirements and exemptions, beneﬁt reduction
rates and earnings disregards, diversion programs (under which welfare
applicants who agree to stay off welfare for an extended period receive
short-term cash payments), child support enforcement and treatment of
child support income, and child care subsidies. They also gather detailed
information about states’ policies other than those directly related to
AFDC and TANF. Among these are the state earned income tax credit (as
of 2003, seventeen states had enacted their own EITCs supplementing the
federal credit), food stamps (the rules for which are set at the federal level),
Medicaid (for which the timing of implementation of various limits and
mandates differs among states), and the State Children’s Health Insur-
ance Program (created in 1997, which gave states some flexibility in the
use of federal grants for health insurance for children).
The authors’data set contains 127,119 observations on the households
of single mothers eighteen years and older over the period 1980–2002.
Before reporting the results of their econometric study, the authors provide
a rich description of the salient features of this sample. They find that the
racial composition of their sample has been stable over time at about 62
to 65 percent white and 32 to 35 percent black, but that the proportion of
single mothers who were never married has grown steadily and dramati-
cally, from 15.6 percent to 41.3 percent. The proportion of single mothers
with only one child increased somewhat, and the share with four or more
children decreased from 7.7 percent in 1980 to 4.7 percent in 2002.
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with at least some college substantially increased over the period, demo-
graphic shifts have been gradual since 1996, suggesting that they do not
account for much of the huge drop in welfare caseloads that has occurred.
National welfare and work participation rates were quite stable until
1993. Welfare participation then declined spectacularly, from 32 percent in
1993 to 7 percent in 2002, and work participation grew signiﬁcantly before
dropping back with the 2001 recession. Levels and trends of both welfare
and work participation rates differ markedly among eight large states that
the authors examine in detail. For example, the trends in welfare partici-
pation in California, Florida, and Texas are roughly consistent with the
national trends, but the downtrend started much earlier in Michigan (in
1983) and Illinois (1987). The peak in Pennsylvania came in 1984, but a
second runup followed, peaking in 1992, and participation in New York
and North Carolina peaked a bit earlier than in the nation as a whole. Dif-
ferences in the patterns of work participation are just as noticeable, and
in each of the large states the trends are roughly opposite to the trends in
welfare participation. Such differences across states are hard to explain
without using information about states’differences in policy and imple-
mentation, and the differences in states’experiences should help identify
which elements of welfare reform have had the greatest effects. 
The authors find substantial differences in the levels and trends of wel-
fare and work participation rates for mothers of different races, educa-
tional attainments, and marital status. Although most of these differences
are consistent with what one would expect and shed little light on the
importance of particular reform features, they do highlight the value of
distinguishing demographic groups in the estimation and taking into
account demographic composition when explaining individual states’
experiences. Some findings are suggestive. For example, the fact that the
drop in participation from 1994 to 2002 is not systematically larger for
mothers with younger children seems inconsistent with effects being
purely anticipatory. (The authors distinguish the direct effects of welfare
reform, such as the effect of time limits in removing recipients from the
rolls, from the anticipatory effects, which result from single mothers tak-
ing into account how their current acceptance of benefits might affect
their future access to the welfare system.) Time limits are less likely to
discourage welfare receipt if a woman’s children are older, because it is
then more likely that she will be ineligible for welfare in any case should
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ticipation from 1993 to 2002 was much greater for single women with
two or more children than for those with one child suggests the possible
importance of changes in the EITC. The EITC phase-in rate for women
with one child increased by only 5.8 percentage points during that period,
while that for women with two or more children increased by 13 per-
centage points. In general, the authors reason, a model explaining changes
in work and welfare participation by state needs to recognize differences
in states’demographic composition and the importance of interactions
of policy variables with demographic characteristics.
As already discussed, the authors believe it is important to avoid
reliance on state and time dummy variables, instead bringing to bear the
detailed information they have gathered about each state’s welfare policy
in each year. They devote great care to constructing variables from this
information that, they believe, capture the important incentive effects of
welfare policy. For example, their estimation equations include a dummy
for whether a state imposed a time limit in a given year, as well as a
dummy for whether the time limit could have been binding for a particu-
lar woman, given the ages of her children. They also include variables
allowing the anticipatory and direct effects of limits on welfare and work
decisions to develop gradually over time, including variables for the num-
ber of months since the implementation of time limits, the number of
months since the limits could first have been binding, the time remaining
until a woman’s youngest child reaches eighteen, and the stock of eligible
months remaining to her. Similar care is devoted to capturing other ele-
ments of the welfare laws and how they potentially affect individuals. This
substantial menu of variables, intended to capture the entire range of pol-
icy changes that occurred at the state level over 1980–2002, is interacted
with a range of demographic controls to allow for the fact that policies
affect different groups differently. In addition, the authors include several
variables to control for state and national economic conditions, including
state unemployment rates, the minimum wage (the higher of the national
or the state minimum), and certain features of the income tax. All in all,
their model requires estimation of 245 parameters. Although this may
seem like a large number, the authors suggest that it is remarkably parsi-
monious relative to specifications that interact both time and state dum-
mies with demographic characteristics. They also note that, despite the
number of variables, their 127,000 observations leave many degrees of
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list of variables was chosen a priori, not by a speciﬁcation search; they nei-
ther added variables in an attempt to improve the fit nor deleted variables
that proved insigniﬁcant. 
The authors observe that the credibility of the model’s policy implica-
tions depends in part on how well the model ﬁts the data. They display how
the model tracks actual welfare and work participation rates for single
mothers for the entire 1980–2002 period at the national level, for each of
the eight large states, and for the various demographic groups. As might be
expected given the rich parameterization, at the national level the model
tracks work and welfare participation almost exactly. Many parameters are
allowed to differ by demographic group; nevertheless, it is impressive how
well the model tracks the signiﬁcantly different behaviors of mothers who
differ in educational background, marital status, number of children, and
race. Even more impressive, given that the model neither uses state fixed
effects nor allows coefﬁcients on variables to vary by state, is that it repli-
cates quite well the differences across states in terms of both levels and
changes over time. For example, in the early 1990s welfare participation in
Texas was around 20 percent, while in Michigan it was around 45 per-
cent, yet the model captures both extremes. Strikingly, the model also
correctly predicts the downward trend in welfare participation in Illinois,
Michigan, and Pennsylvania that began in the mid-1980s, well before the
national downtrend. It has similar success in predicting work participa-
tion rates, catching the upward trend in Michigan over 1983–2000 while
also predicting the plateauing of the participation rate in California from
1980 to 1995, the rapid jump in 1996–98, and the subsequent flattening.
It also predicts the several turning points in Florida and Pennsylvania.
The model’s main failure is that it consistently overestimates welfare par-
ticipation in California by about 5 percentage points. 
In a model with so many interaction terms, it is difficult to interpret
the parameter estimates or to assess their plausibility. To give an intuition
of the estimates’implications for behavior, the authors use the model to
predict the effects for welfare participation of imposing work requirements
and time limits at various unemployment rates. They perform these cal-
culations for single mothers with sixteen different combinations of demo-
graphic characteristics. Imposing time limits and work requirements is
found to have a much greater effect on high school dropouts than on
college graduates. Women with younger children respond more than
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effects of imposing work requirements and time limits are substantial, gen-
erally reducing participation on the order of 20 to 35 percentage points
for those demographic groups with the highest welfare participation rates.
Increasing the unemployment rate from 4 percent to 8 percent increases
welfare participation, but not dramatically. 
The major questions the paper attempts to answer are the importance
of the 1996 welfare reform legislation overall and the relative contribu-
tions of its various provisions and of other features of the economic envi-
ronment to the dramatic reductions in welfare and increases in work
participation since its enactment. The authors answer these questions by
conducting six counterfactual experiments, simulating for each of several
economic or policy variables what welfare and work participation from
1994 to 2002 would have been if that variable had stayed ﬁxed at its 1993
level while all other variables followed their actual path. These calcula-
tions show that eliminating time limits in all states that imposed them
would have had relatively little effect: time limits are credited with only
2.5 percentage points of the total 23.8-percentage-point drop in welfare
participation from 1993 to 2002. In contrast, the simulations imply that the
drop would have been only 10 percentage points in the absence of work
requirements, making that the most important feature of reform. Accord-
ing to the model, the expansion in the EITC was second in importance,
accounting for 6.2 percentage points of the drop. Not surprisingly, given
the recession of 2001, the unemployment rate accounts for only 1.6 per-
centage points of the reduction over the whole period, but it contributed
2.4 percentage points (21 percent) of the total decline by 1997 and 2.9 per-
centage points (about 15 percent) of the total decline in 2000. The other
policies considered, child care subsidy programs and Medicaid expansion,
also had significant effects. The simulations show interesting differences
in the effects of time limits and work requirements for different groups.
Macroeconomic conditions played a more important role for blacks than
for whites; work requirements and the extension of the EITC are more
important than time limits, irrespective of the age of the youngest child,
but there is evidence that time limits are more important for mothers with
younger children. Time limits also appear to have signiﬁcant effects on the
participation of never-married mothers and of mothers with two or more
children. 
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participation differs drastically from that for welfare participation. Until
2001, when the recession set in, the reduction in the unemployment rate,
measured at the state level, was the most important contributor to
increased work participation, accounting for more than 40 percent of the
total rise. However, consistent with the view that macroeconomic condi-
tions are less important for mothers with young children, the authors find
smaller effects of unemployment for this group: the EITC expansion and
work requirements together explain more than 40 percent of the increase
in their work participation by the end of the period. One of the most inter-
esting ﬁndings is that different features of the reform are important for dif-
ferent education groups. Work requirements account for 43 percent of the
17-percentage-point increase in work participation among high school
dropouts, but a negligible part of the 7-percentage-point increase in work
participation of more-educated single mothers. The behavior of the more
educated group appears to be driven almost entirely by changes in the
EITC and the macroeonomy. The authors suggest that this may be because
more-educated women can command higher wages, so that improvements
in the EITC push them above their reservation wage. Hence, compared
with less educated women, this group is more likely to have been made
better off by reform and the improved economy, and less likely to have
entered the work force because of a binding work requirement. The
authors are troubled by the fact that one quarter of the single mothers who
left welfare did not enter the labor force. The study cannot track what has
happened to these individuals or their children.
The authors believe they have included reasonable measures of all of
the empirical aspects of the policy and economic environment that could
be plausibly considered important, including every aspect that Rebecca
Blank hypothesized as potentially important in her 2002 survey. But they
note that many important questions remain unanswered. Perhaps the most
interesting relate to the long-run effects of reform. If the children of moth-
ers who have left welfare and not gone to work have been made worse
off, will more of them show up as dependent on welfare in the future than
would have under the old system? Or will the effects of reform on the
welfare culture have even more dramatic positive results in the long run?
Reform may have come too late for the current generation of dependents,
but it may lead the next generation to invest in education and the acquisition
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These questions are inherently difficult to answer, and well beyond the
capabilities of the authors’model, but they are important areas for future
research. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest region in the world and the only
major underdeveloped region whose income per capita has declined since
1980. Africa’s health conditions are the world’s worst, with populations
in many areas devastated by the emergence of AIDS and the resurgence
of malaria. Africa’s rapid population growth, which exceeds that in other
developing regions, contributes to keeping much of the population at a
subsistence level, and to a strikingly lower life expectancy and higher
rate of child mortality than other regions, with 17 percent of newborns
dying before the age of five. The apparent worsening of Africa’s plight,
despite past international attempts to provide aid, has led many observers
to conclude that bad governance is the heart of the problem and that, until
Africa’s governments change, any new aid initiative is doomed to fail. In
the second article of this issue, Jeffrey Sachs and six of his colleagues on
the UN Millennium Project sharply disagree with this assessment. They
argue that the heart of Africa’s problem lies in unique structural conditions
that have left Africa in a poverty trap. They explain why they believe it can
escape the trap only with the infusion of well-targeted and massive aid.
And they offer a blueprint for a major international initiative to provide
such aid. 
The authors start with a theoretical model of the growth process in
poor countries. The basic relationships are those of the familiar neoclas-
sical growth model. Output per capita depends on the capital-labor ratio
and total factor productivity. In the absence of capital imports, changes in
the capital-labor ratio depend on the difference between the gross invest-
ment rate, which equals the national saving rate, and the sum of the depre-
ciation rate and the labor force growth rate. In the standard model, an
economy with a small initial capital stock and a low capital-labor ratio
could be expected to grow by increasing its capital-labor ratio; decreas-
ing returns to this capital deepening would eventually lead to an equilib-
rium capital-labor ratio at a higher output per capita. However, the authors
identify three factors that they believe interfere with this process in
Africa’s very poor economies, requiring amendments to the standard
model. First, the capital stock must exceed some threshold before further
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It is particularly lacking in basic infrastructure and in human capital (lit-
erate and numerate workers), and without these the marginal productivity
of new capital is abnormally low, not high as the standard model implies.
Second, with incomes near subsistence for most of the population, few
households can save; in fact, national saving is near zero in many of these
African countries. This leaves the economy in a saving trap, in which the
already low capital stock declines rather than rising toward an equilibrium.
Third, Africa suffers from a demographic trap, in which rapid population
growth pushes the capital-labor ratio and income per capita still lower.
Together these factors create a poverty trap, from which Africa cannot
extricate itself without outside financial assistance. Low and only slowly
rising productivity adds to the region’s problems.
The authors discuss five main structural reasons that they believe
explain why Africa remains caught in a poverty trap while countries in
other parts of the world have escaped. These are very high transport costs,
low-productivity agriculture, a very heavy disease burden, adverse geopol-
itics, and very slow diffusion of technology from abroad. Most Africans
south of the Sahara live and work in the interior of the continent. Few
natural navigable waterways provide access to coastal ports, and no high-
way network exists to connect these populated inland parts of Africa with
each other and with the coast. By the standard metric, kilometers of paved
road per 1,000 population, Africa lags far behind all other developing
regions. The resulting very high transport costs are a serious hurdle to
development—a point that, the authors note, was first made by Adam
Smith. Agricultural productivity is very low because the continent has
relatively few large rivers, insufficient and erratic rainfall, and no infra-
structure to manage the water that might be available, and because the high
transport costs make chemical fertilizers uneconomic. The share of
Africa’s agricultural land that is irrigated is one-twentieth that in other
developing regions, and African farmers use only 6 percent as much fer-
tilizer per acre. The burden of disease has always been a problem for
Africa and has worsened in recent times. The prevalence of AIDS is many
times that in other regions. Malaria is both more widespread and more
severe than elsewhere, and its control would require far larger outlays than
Africa can afford. 
Turning to the historical geopolitics of the region, the authors remind us
that Africa suffered at the hands of Europeans and Arabs for centuries. The
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totally inadequate infrastructure and an undereducated population, a poor
framework for self-governance, and unnatural borders that ignored tribal
relations. More recently, when aid to developing regions has been influ-
enced by the cold war and by economic considerations in the rich coun-
tries, Africa has been too distant and too small a market to get much
attention or assistance. Even today trade discrimination by the world’s
industrial countries limits potential exports from Africa. Finally, advances
in agricultural and health technology have been of little use to Africa, in
part because they were unaffordable, but also because they were often
unsuitable to Africa’s needs. In particular, the Green Revolution that so
beneﬁted most of the developing world was based on scientiﬁc crop breed-
ing that did not easily transfer to conditions in Africa and that required fer-
tilizer and irrigation that African farmers did not have. 
Support for the authors’description of Africa’s problems comes from
recent growth accounting studies covering the past two decades. Using
the analysis presented by Barry Bosworth and Susan Collins in a 2003
Brookings Paper, they show that Africa’s decline in output per worker in
the 1980s and 1990s is associated with declines in physical capital per
worker and in total factor productivity in both decades. Using their own
decomposition of the neoclassical growth model described earlier, they
show that it is a good predictor of the differences in growth rates across
developing regions. The model ascribes Africa’s negative growth in this
period to the inadequacy of its saving relative to its population growth
and capital depreciation. As conventionally measured, Africa’s gross sav-
ing was only 11 percent of gross product, compared with saving rates rang-
ing between 19 and 35 percent in other developing regions. They also
show that, if the estimated depletion of Africa’s natural resources is sub-
tracted from ofﬁcially measured saving, net saving in the region was only
1 to 3 percent of gross product in these decades.
The authors believe that these structural impediments to growth explain
why Africa’s development has lagged so badly, but they are also convinced
that those impediments can be overcome with help from the developed
world of the right amount and kind. The central conclusion that the authors
draw from their model is the need to increase Africa’s physical and human
capital stock above the threshold for self-sustaining growth. With saving
kept low by poverty, this will require massive external aid that provides
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ment of the capital stock would be expected to set several developments
in motion. It would raise the marginal productivity of subsequent invest-
ment, raise national saving by bringing more of the population above the
subsistence level, and lower population growth, which is now high mainly
because children are a source of labor for destitute families. Although the
eventual aim is self-sufficiency, the authors warn that achieving it will
require aid on a much larger scale than Africa has ever received, and that
many African countries will require aid on a large scale for decades. As an
intermediate target for their proposals, they choose the UN’s Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) for 2015, and they calculate the magnitude
and composition of aid ﬂows that would be required to meet these goals. 
The authors organize their analysis of needed investments around sev-
eral broad categories of intervention, such as agricultural productivity, and
more detailed subcategories, such as soil health and water management.
Appendices list the proposed interventions in detail and relate them to the
MDGs. The authors illustrate their approach by summarizing current con-
ditions in Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda with respect to certain MDG-
related indicators such as poverty rates, prevalence of child malnutrition,
and school enrollment rates. The shortfalls from the targets for these indi-
cators provide the basis for budgeting investment requirements. The gap
between these requirements and how much can be expected from house-
holds and from each country’s own government then determines the
amount of external aid that the country needs. 
To achieve the MDGs in these three countries by 2015 would require
total annual external aid averaging 13.7 to 16.6 percent of their GDP,
which comes to $49 to $60 per capita. These requirements amount to an
annual average need for aid of $1.2 billion for Ghana, $2.5 billion for
Tanzania (the furthest of the three from meeting the MDGs), and $1.6 bil-
lion for Uganda. In all three countries, health services is the area needing
the most aid, accounting for over a third of the total. It is noteworthy that
the authors’interventions give particular attention to improving the eco-
nomic and social status of women, not only on humanitarian grounds but
also because women are responsible for so much of the work and child
rearing in Africa, so that improvements on many important fronts will have
to ﬂow through them. The authors’methodology also yields detailed esti-
mates of human resource and infrastructure requirements, such as how
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presented in the paper. 
Taken all together, the authors’estimates imply that aid will cover
roughly 60 percent of investment needs in the thirty-three countries in
their sample, with the remaining roughly 40 percent coming from house-
holds and domestic governments. These countries are already receiving
official development assistance (ODA), roughly half of which the authors
identify as helping toward the MDGs. On the assumption that the other
half, which supports judicial systems and other institutions of gover-
nance, continues at present levels, this implies a current shortfall of
annual ODA of $29 per capita for Uganda, $33 per capita for Ghana, and
$42 per capita for Tanzania. Covering these shortfalls brings aid needs
up to 19 to 22 percent of GDP. After adding in the overhead costs of
delivering aid and some additional “big ticket” items, the authors judge
that total ODA to these countries will have to average between 20 and
30 percent of their GDP. This would represent at least a doubling of pres-
ent aid efforts. 
The authors believe such massive aid to Africa can be effective, but oth-
ers have expressed doubts, and the paper addresses their main concerns.
The authors recognize that a reasonable level of governance in recipient
countries is essential, and they propose that it be a precondition for receiv-
ing aid. But they reject the widespread impression that a governance cri-
sis is the main cause of Africa’s poverty. They note that the highly visible
examples of terrible governance in Angola, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Sudan, and Zimbabwe understandably foster such an impression, but they
show that it does not characterize most of the nations of Africa. On a mea-
sure devised by Steven Radelet based on World Bank governance indica-
tors, twenty-six of the thirty-three countries in the authors’sample have a
rating of good or average. This measure rates countries by how their gov-
ernance compares with that in other countries with similar income per
capita (since income correlates positively with government effectiveness).
An alternative measure from Transparency International, which also
allows for income effects, assigns only one of the thirty-three countries
(Angola) a poor governance rating, although thirteen of the countries are
not rated, including four of the six with highly visible problems mentioned
above. A third ranking, provided by Freedom House, rates those same six
countries as not free, along with seven of the remaining countries in the
sample. The authors infer that there are many African countries on which
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rising incomes would be expected to improve governance in those coun-
tries that receive it. 
Another concern is that further aid would end up going to consump-
tion rather than investment. The authors believe that donors can guard
against this by targeting aid to priority investments in the public sector and
by designing ways to monitor the budgeting and expenditure process,
including enlisting local nongovernmental organizations in this task. They
also reject the argument that recipient countries would offset the intended
benefits of aid by reducing their own efforts in the targeted areas: these
countries, they argue, currently undertake so little public investment that
there is little scope to reduce it further. 
The authors do recognize that efficiently delivering the needed large
increase in aid will pose a great challenge to both donors and recipients.
They conclude by addressing this challenge along with some other issues
of political economy of importance to Africa’s development prospects.
Mindful of the inadequacies of many past aid efforts, they offer four guid-
ing principles for how both donors and recipients should alter their think-
ing about aid going forward. First, because the present limits on what
African countries can absorb put constraints on what can be done within
a short time horizon, they urge lengthening donors’horizons so as to focus
on expanding those limits. Targeting outcomes for 2015 accomplishes this.
Second, because the present top-down approach to aid planning locks the
process into one of allocating predetermined sums, the authors urge a plan-
ning process based on a bottom-up assessment designed to reveal the need
for greater and more extended assistance. Third, they urge the coordination
of donor assistance through international organizations, both to avoid
unnecessary transactions costs and to target the aid more effectively
toward the identified goals. Fourth, they remind donors that projects will
take many years to become ﬁnancially self-sustaining, which implies that
assistance should take the form of grants rather than loans, since loans
for the long-term projects that Africa requires would become an insup-
portable burden long before the benefits materialize. The authors discuss
several other issues relevant to Africa’s development, such as how the
planning and implementation of assistance programs might be organized,
the special problems of providing aid in countries with weak governance,
and the importance of trade reform as an adjunct to assistance programs.
Their thorough discussion of Africa’s difficulties and how to deal with
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istic promise that they can be met. 
The U.S. stock market can be described as having gone through three
distinct twenty-year episodes in the period since World War II: a bull mar-
ket from the war to the mid-1960s, a bear market in the 1970s and early
1980s, and a spectacular boom from the mid-1980s through the 1990s. A
variety of explanations have been offered for the two extended bull mar-
kets of that sixty-year period: increased participation in the stock market,
fading memories of the great crash of 1929, and raised expectations of pro-
ductivity growth due to technological innovation and a “new economy.”
Economists have found it harder to explain the sustained bear market sand-
wiched in between. The same secular changes that help rationalize the bull
markets before and after should also have been at work then. Although
the oil crises of the 1970s and slower productivity growth did contribute to
lower corporate earnings, they do not explain why those earnings were val-
ued so low by the market. This inability to explain the bear market of the
1970s and 1980s as reflecting rational responses to fundamentals has led
some economists to suggest that investors confuse nominal with real inter-
est rates, or to invoke random shocks or unobservable beliefs, to explain
the market’s cycles. Others, however, have suggested that demographic
factors—speciﬁcally, wide swings in the U.S. birth rate across the twenti-
eth century—may be important in explaining the ﬂuctuations in the prices
of both stocks and durable assets such as housing. As is well known,
through most of the century just ended, live births in the United States
went through alternating booms and busts, resulting in systematic changes
in the age distribution of the population over the postwar period. In the
third article of this issue, John Geanakoplos, Michael Magill, and Mar-
tine Quinzii examine whether these demographic ﬂuctuations can provide
a uniﬁed explanation of the long swings in the market. 
Motivating the authors’analysis is the observation that individuals have
different ﬁnancial needs at different times of their life, typically borrowing
during their young adulthood, saving for retirement when middle-aged,
and dissaving during retirement. When the middle-aged savers in the pop-
ulation are numerous relative to the dissavers (retirees and younger house-
holds), the demand for assets to hold as wealth is likely to be high, putting
upward pressure on the prices of stocks, houses, and the physical capital of
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same prices fall under downward pressure.
To clarify this mechanism, the authors construct a life-cycle model
that recognizes the different income and consumption behavior of house-
holds of different ages and that assumes that the birth rate, and hence the
population age structure, follow a twenty-year cycle. They begin with a
highly stylized, nonstochastic version of the model with only three eco-
nomically active age cohorts—young, middle-aged, and retired—and in
which the only asset available for holding savings is a claim on land. The
quantity of land is ﬁxed, but the population and its composition systemat-
ically vary. Each twenty-year period is characterized by an “age pyramid”;
odd-numbered pyramids consist of a large young cohort, a small middle-
aged cohort, and a large retired cohort, and even-numbered pyramids con-
sist of a small young, a large middle-aged, and a small retired cohort. The
authors later analyze the effects of introducing a variety of more realistic
features into the model: a larger number of age cohorts, the need to support
children when young, the presence of Social Security and a desire to make
bequests, endogeneity of the capital stock, and uncertainty about future
wages and dividends. The model embeds a demographic cycle whose
amplitude corresponds roughly to the relative sizes of the Great Depres-
sion and baby-boom generations. Abstracting from the very long term
trend in population growth, as the authors do, the latter generation was
about one and a half times as large as the former. 
To focus on the implications of demographic ﬂuctuations, other features
of the model are kept quite simple. A single physical good is produced
each period by labor or land. Middle-aged workers are assumed to produce
and be paid for three units of the good, and young workers two units. This
ratio of one and a half to one is roughly in line with the ratio of average
earnings of individuals in the 45–54 and 25–34 age groups in census
data. Retirees have zero earned income, living entirely on savings. Since
middle-aged workers produce more than young workers, total labor
income and product vary over time with the relative size of their popula-
tions, even though the total number of workers is constant. Land is the only
physical asset in the economy, and the authors refer to claims on land as
equity. The fixed quantity of land is assumed to deliver a constant “divi-
dend” of approximately 20 percent of average labor income, comparable
to the combined income share of all forms of capital in the national income
accounts (not counting retained earnings, which are assumed to be needed
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7 percent higher when the middle-aged population is relatively large than
when it is relatively small. 
Finding the equilibrium real interest rate and the price of land is rela-
tively straightforward in this model. Individuals maximize the sum of the
utilities in the three periods of their life, discounted by their personal rate
of time preference, subject to the constraint that the present value of life-
time consumption is equal to that of lifetime labor income (there are no
bequests in this basic model). Saving and dissaving during an individ-
ual’s life are accomplished by buying and selling land. Even though indi-
vidual cohorts save and dissave over their lifetime, in the absence of
demographic ﬂuctuations total income and consumption are constant, and
so is the market-clearing interest rate. If the interest rate equaled the rate of
time preference of individuals, they would want to consume the same
amount each period. With both rates set at approximately 3.5 percent a
year, consumption of two units of the good in each stage of life is feasi-
ble. At that interest rate, individuals choose to consume their two units of
labor income received when young, and to save (and invest in land) one
of the three units of income they receive when middle-aged. The value of
dividends received over twenty years equals the value of the land that
generates them, representing a return of 3.5 percent a year. In retirement
the proceeds from dividends and the sale of land to the next generation
support consumption of two units. The price of land is the present dis-
counted value of the constant future dividends and so is the same at the
time of sale as when it was bought twenty years earlier. 
When instead cohort size ﬂuctuates, equilibrium interest rates and div-
idend yields have to vary. If land were priced to yield a constant 3.5 per-
cent annual return, then, when the middle-aged cohort is large (that is, in
even-numbered periods), their demand for land (saving) would exceed
the supply of land (dissaving) of the smaller retiree population. This would
put upward pressure on land prices, and thus downward pressure on
interest rates. When the middle-aged cohort is relatively small (in odd-
numbered periods), the opposite would be true. But with just two different-
sized middle-aged and retiree cohorts, land prices and interest rates simply
alternate in value from period to period. How much do they vary between
even- and odd-numbered periods as the middle-aged cohort varies between
large and small? The calculation is more complicated than in the absence
of demographic fluctuations but still quite straightforward by virtue of
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above discussion, the ratio of peak to trough land prices will depend on the
relative size of the cohorts (in the central case the large cohort is roughly
50 percent larger than the small) and on the elasticity of saving with
respect to interest rates. The authors assume a utility function with con-
stant relative risk aversion, with 4 as the degree of risk aversion. This is a
relatively high value, corresponding to a relatively low value of 0.25 for
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. For this value (as for any elas-
ticity less than 1), an increase in the interest rate decreases saving, since
the income effect then dominates the substitution effect. Small cohorts in
their middle-aged years face relatively low land prices and high rates of
return. Although the higher rates encourage these cohorts to shift con-
sumption toward retirement, they can and will also use their higher
incomes to increase their consumption in middle age. Thus the system-
atic fluctuation in rates favors the small cohorts. If individuals are for-
ward looking, as assumed, these cohorts will anticipate this positive
income effect when young and increase consumption then, too. Matters are
reversed for large cohorts. 
The authors show that, in this base model, ﬂuctuations in the population
age structure of roughly the magnitude observed in the United States can
account for very large fluctuations in interest rates and asset prices. For
their central case, with a degree of risk aversion of 4 and with a cohort size
ratio of 1.5 to 1, the difference between peak and trough real interest rates
would be 6.5 percentage points. Such variation in interest rates corre-
sponds to substantial variation in asset prices. The high rate of return
expected by a small middle-aged cohort reflects both a high current divi-
dend return and an anticipated capital gain. The situation is reversed in
periods when the middle-aged cohort is large and the retiree population
small. With a degree of risk aversion of 4, the land price (and the price-
earnings ratio) in even-numbered periods is 2.3 times its value in odd-
numbered periods. Capital gains amount to slightly over half of the total
6.5 percent annual return. More-modest demographic ﬂuctuations result in
correspondingly moderate ﬂuctuations in rates and asset prices. For exam-
ple, with a cohort size ratio of 1.15 to 1 (which corresponds to the ratio of
baby-boomers to the baby-busters that followed them), the difference in
rates would be only about 2.2 percentage points, and the ratio of land
prices only 1.3 to 1. Capital gains play a much smaller role than divi-
dends in this scenario. More generally, for a degree of risk aversion of 4,
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sizes of the middle-aged and young adult cohorts. 
The authors recognize that their basic model ignores a number of fea-
tures of the real world that could signiﬁcantly affect the behavior of inter-
est rates and prices. In particular, the base model ignores the consumption
needs of children, the desire for bequests, and the existence of a pay-as-
you-go public pension system (Social Security), all of which are likely to
affect the life-cycle pattern of saving. This leads the authors to modify
their assumed utility function, recognizing the presence of children when
a cohort is young and the desire to make bequests when it is old. They
change the budget constraint to reﬂect the receipt of bequests and the pres-
ence of a pay-as-you-go Social Security system, with constant beneﬁts and
a time-varying tax rate on earned income that balances the Social Secu-
rity budget in each twenty-year period. The parameter values chosen for
these features are in line with conventional wisdom. A child ends up with
half the consumption of an adult; the assumed bequest preferences gener-
ate bequests of 15.5 to 18.5 percent of aggregate income; and the Social
Security transfers vary between 6.5 percent and 10.5 percent of total
income, bracketing the actual ratio of Social Security transfers and
Medicare beneﬁts to national income in the late 1990s. 
Implicit in the model is that small cohorts have large families and large
cohorts have small ones. The presence of children during a household’s
early years decreases saving and lowers average asset prices, but the
decrease in saving is greater when the cohort is small, and this amplifies
the ﬂuctuations in interest rates and asset prices that occur. Social Security
has a similar effect, decreasing private saving but also amplifying its ﬂuc-
tuations. The reason is that, in odd-numbered periods, with a small middle-
aged and a large retired cohort, earned income is relatively low and Social
Security benefits are high, requiring a high payroll tax rate. Bequests, by
raising incomes in middle age and reducing needs when retired, have the
opposite effect, increasing desired saving. This raises average asset prices
and, because small cohorts receive relatively larger bequests (individuals
are assumed not to take into account how many children they have when
planning bequests), dampens asset price fluctuations. The authors show
that although each of these features taken individually implies substantial
changes in the behavior of rates and prices, when taken together they
almost balance out. Although the average level of interest rates is higher
and that of asset prices lower, the ratio of asset prices and the difference
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assuming a less extreme value for the rate of time preference would bring
the average level into line with the base model. 
In the base model the supply of land, the only asset, is ﬁxed. Changes in
desired saving reﬂecting changes in the age structure can be accomplished
only by changing the price of land, with accompanying changes in inter-
est rates. In reality, reproducible assets are available as a store of value and
indeed make up a large fraction of wealth. If the asset used as a store of
value is elastically supplied, its quantity will adjust to changes in demand,
and prices and interest rates will fluctuate less than when land is the only
asset. Since demographic changes are slow, such adjustments can be rela-
tively modest on a yearly basis. However, the implied diversion of domes-
tic resources from consumption to investment will in general require some
changes in prices and rates, although they will be smaller than in the model
where land is the only asset. Furthermore, in a world with integrated cap-
ital markets, domestic savers can also invest in foreign capital, further
dampening the rate and price fluctuations induced by idiosyncratic
national demographics. 
To explore the dampening role of reproducible capital accumulation,
the authors augment their model with a Cobb-Douglas production function
for the single good, which can now be used for additions to the capital
stock as well as for consumption. Wages and dividends are now endoge-
nous and depend on the capital-to-labor ratio. The capital stock is rela-
tively low in times of even-numbered pyramids, so that the earned incomes
of members of a large middle-aged cohort are lower than in the land-only
economy. This reduces their lifetime earnings and their demand for sav-
ing in middle age. If the cost of capital in terms of goods does not depend
on the rate of investment, the effect of demographic changes on interest
rates and equity prices is substantially muted. The interest rate in even-
numbered periods is now just 1.3 percentage points lower than in odd-
numbered periods. Equity prices rise in this case, not because of changes
in the price of a unit of scarce capital in terms of goods, but because ﬁrms
use retained earnings to add to their capital stock. In even-numbered peri-
ods, a share of equity constitutes a claim to 40 percent more capital than in
odd-numbered periods, and so the value of a firm is correspondingly
40 percent higher. This contrasts with the 130 percent higher price of land
in the base model. In this costless adjustment case, the dividend-price ratio
actually ﬂuctuates slightly more than in the land-only model, reﬂecting the
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numbered periods when investment is high. 
With what the authors regard as a moderate cost of adjustment, the ﬂuc-
tuations in the value of equity and the size of the capital stock are between
these extremes of the land-only case and the case of costless adjustment of
reproducible capital. In even-numbered periods, the capital stock is only
17 percent larger, requiring about 0.8 percent faster annual growth in the
stock over their twenty-year interval. The price of capital—that is, its cost
in terms of consumption goods—is 54 percent higher. Together these
increases in the price and quantity of capital yield a total increase in share
prices of 80 percent in even-numbered periods. Although this result is
reasonable compared with historical fluctuations in the stock market, the
part attributed to the price of a unit of capital seems large, and the rise in
the capital stock seems small.
Although the essential features of the demographic cycle are illustrated
in the three-period model, the authors note that the model’s use of twenty-
year periods obscures the more subtle dynamics of real-world interest rates
and equity prices. To explore these richer dynamics, the authors return to
the simple land model and split each twenty-year period into ﬁve four-year
periods, appropriately smoothing the population growth rates and wage
proﬁles. Consistent with the fundamental intuition that relates land prices
to the relative numbers of savers and dissavers, land prices in this version
of the model peak when the ratio of middle-aged to retirees peaks (which
is also when the ratio of middle-aged to young adults peaks). Land prices
are increasing when that ratio is increasing, and decreasing when the ratio
is decreasing. Given the cyclical pattern of the birth rate, this rate of
change of prices is highest in the middle of the period when equity prices
are rising, and lowest in the middle of the period when they are falling;
the turning points in the twenty-year rate of return occur at the same
points. The authors observe that the synchronous behavior of the ratio of
cohort sizes and equity prices and the nonsynchronous behavior of cohorts
and rates of return in the model may help explain why empirical studies
have found a correlation of age demographics with the level of equity
prices, but not with rates of return. 
The authors are struck by the similarities in the episodic behavior of the
stock market and birth rates, but they do not expect demographic factors to
explain more than a fraction of market fluctuations, and thus they are not
surprised that their simple model explains less than half of the observed
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years. They point to many other, nonpredictable factors that could have
been important inﬂuences on the market during this period. The 1970s and
early 1980s witnessed many identiﬁable negative shocks, including bursts
of inflation followed by restrictive monetary policy, as well as OPEC-
related disruptions and adverse productivity shocks. In the 1990s, by con-
trast, most of the identifiable shocks were positive, including a return to
favorable energy prices, low inﬂation, and high rates of technical progress. 
Recognition of such shocks not only helps in fitting the model to the
postwar experience, but also highlights the importance of the risks faced
by individuals in planning their life-cycle consumption and saving. This
leads the authors to introduce random shocks to dividends and wages in
their base model in order to analyze their effects. To capture what they
see as the central risks facing individuals, they use a simple stochastic
structure that recognizes four states of the world: high wages and high div-
idends, high wages and low dividends, low wages and high dividends,
and low wages and low dividends. They assign probabilities to each of
these states that capture the positive correlation between dividends and
wages observed in the data and that imply plausible coefficients of varia-
tion in dividends and the earned income of the young and the middle-aged. 
In this model, ﬁnancial markets are incomplete, and intertemporal trade
can take place only in bonds and equities. The introduction of uncertainty
makes equities no longer perfect substitutes for bonds. Solving this sto-
chastic version of the model is much more complicated than solving the
nonstochastic version, since one has to keep track not only of the (exoge-
nous) population pyramids and the current state of the world, but also of
the portfolio income brought into middle age, which itself depends on past
shocks. Fortunately these “history” effects are relatively small, so that the
average values of equity prices and interest rates in any current state of
the world are representative of equilibrium prices for that state. The
authors find that the presence of shocks adds to the realism of the model,
yielding ﬂuctuations in asset prices that reﬂect the risks faced by investors
and that produce large discrepancies between the expected risk premiums
and the realized difference in returns between stocks and bonds. But the
central insight of the nonstochastic model survives: long-run fluctuations
in the demographic structure lead to long-run cyclical ﬂuctuations in secu-
rity prices and interest rates that are similar in magnitude, on average, to
those found in the simple model. 
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individuals face risks to their future wages and to dividends? The answer
is complicated, both because the relative importance of the different risks
varies over the life cycle and because these risks interact with the fluctu-
ating demand for saving arising from changing demographics. The
authors’model, with its explicit stochastic process for the shocks to divi-
dends and wages and its realistic demographic features, provides a good
laboratory for analyzing this question. Like most equilibrium models,
theirs generates smaller risk premiums than those observed historically.
But their model offers a wide range of insights about how the risk pre-
mium might be expected to vary across different circumstances. The
authors discuss why the market risks faced by agents investing in odd-
numbered periods are greater than the risks in even-numbered periods
(their answer lies in the differences in the relative importance of the risks
to dividends and the risks to capital gains) and why the variability of con-
sumption in retirement is greater for large than for small cohorts. These
factors help them explain why, despite the fact that the young are less risk
averse than the middle-aged, the equilibrium risk premium is higher in
odd-numbered periods. The authors also quantify the difference between
ex ante and ex post risk premiums, and they show how the ex ante pre-
mium depends on the state of the world, and how borrowing constraints
and limited participation in equity markets affect the premium.
Although the authors do not undertake detailed empirical testing of
their model, they do examine the correspondence of its predictions with
the stylized facts of the U.S. experience. In the ﬁrst half of the last century,
fluctuations in the ratio of middle-aged to young adults in the population
(the MY ratio) were modest; hence demographics cannot be the major fac-
tor explaining the behavior of stock prices in the Roaring Twenties or the
Great Depression. The authors focus on the price-earnings ratio for stocks
in the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) stock index and show that it moved more
or less in step with the MY ratio during the second half of the century. A
regression of the S&P price-earnings ratio on the MY ratio for the period
1945–2002 yields an R2 of 0.55; the R2 for the period since 1965 is 0.78.
The model is less successful in explaining rates of return, which in the
model should be related to the change in the MY ratio. Although the sign
of the estimated coefﬁcients for both the real rate of return on the S&P and
real short-term interest rates is as the model predicts, the change in the MY
ratio explains only 14 percent of the variation in the return on the S&P, and
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16 percent of the variation in both rates since 1965.
The model does not do well in predicting interest rates during the
1945–65 period. Stock returns were high in the bull market of the 1950s
and early 1960s, but interest rates were low, implying a very large equity
risk premium. According to the model, the risk premium should move with
the MY ratio. However, actual variations in this risk premium, calculated
by assuming that expectations at a given date match the average of actual
returns ex post in the following twenty years, are far greater than what
the model predicts: They exceed 10 percentage points in the 1940s and
the early 1980s, while the model’s predictions all fall in a range of 1 to
2.5 percentage points. Although the predictions are thus off by an order
of magnitude from the calculated risk premiums, the predicted changes in
the premium are in the right direction and occur at roughly the right time. 
Viewing their results broadly, the authors see the model’s ability to
track the major turning points in the stock market as support for the demo-
graphic hypothesis. And they note that the model predicts a decline in U.S.
price-earnings ratios over the next twenty years, because of the demo-
graphic changes on the horizon. The globalization of financial markets,
which will be much more important in the future than it was in the last cen-
tury, implies that demographic changes abroad could alter that outlook.
However, most of the world’s industrialized countries confront demo-
graphic challenges that are at least as severe as those facing the United
States. Thus the authors see investors in the developing world as the main
hope for avoiding the otherwise poor long-run prospects for U.S. equities. 
In their voting behavior as well as in their private economic deci-
sions, individuals are commonly modeled as rational, informed agents who
act in their own interest. Except in town meetings or the occasional refer-
endum, they do not vote directly on economic policies, but they elect the
officials who do. Those officials are thus heavily influenced by public
opinion, which implies, if the standard model is correct, that economic
policy reflects the self-interest of well-informed voters. But how close is
this description to reality? In a report in this volume, Alan Blinder and
Alan Krueger shed light on this question by investigating how, and how
well, voters actually inform themselves on economic policy matters and
analyzing how their opinions are related to a range of possible inﬂuences. 
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ion on an issue depends on self-interest, ideology, factual knowledge and
understanding, and the degree to which public interest overrides self-
interest. People’s knowledge, in turn, depends on the strength of their
desire to be informed, on the sources of information they use, and on the
quantity of information they obtain. The data the authors use to test this
model come from a telephone survey conducted in the spring of 2003,
which reached 1,002 individuals of voting age. The survey first asked a
number of questions about macroeconomic policy, some of which were
factual (How large is the federal budget deficit?) whereas others solicited
a related opinion (Should the deficit be reduced?). The survey also asked
how important the respondent believed it was to be informed about such
issues. A series of questions then explored where the respondents got
their information about the economy. (For example, Do you watch televi-
sion to get economic information, and if so, how often?) The survey also
collected conventional demographic information about respondents as
well as about their income, whether they had voted in 2000, their political
ideology (liberal, conservative, moderate, or nonpolitical), whether they
were covered by health insurance, and whether their parents were alive. 
The authors begin by highlighting some of the findings from their sur-
vey. Three-quarters of respondents thought it was very important or
extremely important to be well informed about economic policy issues.
Fewer than 3 percent thought it was unimportant. This desire to be
informed showed little variation by race, sex, education, income, or ide-
ology, but a larger share of self-described voters than of nonvoters said
they cared about being informed. (The authors note that the share of
respondents who said they had voted in 2000 exceeds the share of the
nationwide voting-age population who actually voted that year.) Respon-
dents were asked which of eleven sources of information they used and
how frequently they used each of them. “Sources” included types of media
and types of individuals (politicians, economists, friends and relatives, and
so forth). Television topped the list of media mentioned most frequently,
with newspapers, the Internet, radio, magazines, and books following, in
that order. When asked which source was the most important to them, tele-
vision was named by nearly half the respondents, dominating all other
sources by a wide margin. Interestingly, 10 percent of respondents named
the Internet as their most important source. Among types of individuals,
friends and relatives tied with political leaders atop the list of those most
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friends and relatives were again on top, and economists came in last. The
authors also provide a range of more detailed findings relating sources of
information to respondents’demographic characteristics. They then use
responses to a question about how frequently sources were used to con-
struct a proxy for the quantity of information in their model, but this proxy
is never statistically signiﬁcant in their subsequent regression analysis. 
Blinder and Krueger are pleasantly surprised by how much their respon-
dents knew about the economy. From the accuracy of individual answers
to specific factual questions, they calculate a knowledge score for each
respondent and relate it to their answers to other survey questions. Curi-
ously, mean average knowledge scores differed little among those who
thought it extremely, very, or somewhat important to be well informed;
scores were noticeably lower, however, for those who thought it unim-
portant. Relating knowledge scores to different media as primary sources
of information, the authors find that the very small percentage of respon-
dents who rely mainly on magazines had the highest scores. The even
smaller percentage who rely mainly on economists were more knowl-
edgeable than those who use other types of individuals as sources. On
average, higher-income individuals scored higher than lower-income indi-
viduals, college-educated respondents scored higher than the less edu-
cated, voters did better than nonvoters, and the nonpoliticals scored lower
than those expressing a political ideology.
Some of the main results on respondents’policy opinions include the
following: 61 percent of respondents said taxes are too high, and 36 per-
cent said they are about right. After being told the size of the federal bud-
get deﬁcit, 50 percent of respondents said the deﬁcit is a serious problem,
and another 38 percent said it is a minor problem. Eighty-eight percent of
respondents said the deficit should be reduced; among these, 45 percent
said it should be reduced mostly by cutting spending, and 47 percent
favored reducing it about equally through spending cuts and tax increases.
Opinions on how to close the prospective Social Security deficits were
noticeably different. Among the 78 percent of respondents who voiced an
opinion, only 5 percent wanted to rely mainly on cutting beneﬁts; the rest
were almost evenly divided between favoring a mixture of beneﬁt cuts and
tax increases and relying on payroll tax increases alone. On other issues,
75 percent of respondents thought the minimum wage should be raised,
80 percent favored adding a prescription drug beneﬁt to Medicare (such a
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health insurance coverage for every American. These and other findings
were also disaggregated by ideology and other characteristics of the
respondents. 
Blinder and Krueger next go beyond the simple relationships in the data
to a series of regressions designed to test their model of how public opin-
ion is formed. Multivariate regressions explaining knowledge scores show
a signiﬁcant positive relationship between factual knowledge and desire to
be informed, as predicted by the model. Income, education, and being mar-
ried are also strongly and positively related to knowledge scores, as is
whether or not the respondent reported having voted. A weaker association
is found between knowledge and the use of newspapers, magazines, and
economists as information sources. Controlling for these variables, the
authors find a significant negative relationship between knowledge and
being a white non-Hispanic, but no signiﬁcant relationship with any other
demographic variable, or with being liberal or conservative. 
The authors next report a series of regressions relating respondents’
opinions on public policy issues to a number of variables, mainly to iden-
tify the relative importance of self-interest, ideology, and knowledge.
Using ordered probit models, they examine opinions—opposed, mixed,
or favorable—on the most recent tax cuts proposed by President George
W. Bush (which were signed into law in May 2003). In these regressions,
along with the basic ideology, demographic, and knowledge variables,
the authors include knowledge of speciﬁc tax facts and a range of respon-
dents’views related to fiscal matters, such as whether taxes are too high
or too low and whether deﬁcits are a major or a minor (or no) problem. A
regression using only income and demographic variables does very little to
account for differences in opinions, showing only that more-educated peo-
ple and blacks are the most opposed to the tax cuts. The regression includ-
ing all variables shows that ideology matters a lot to views on the 2003
tax cuts: liberals oppose and conservatives support the cuts, those with
greater general knowledge tend to oppose them, and those who believe that
taxes are too high tend to support the cuts, whereas those who view taxes
as too low oppose them. Income is not a significant determinant—a sign
that self-interest does not dominate attitudes on this issue, given that the
tax cuts were highly regressive. 
Similar probit regressions for attitudes on deﬁcits—whether the deﬁcit
is seen as a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem—use the same
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variable itself). Those who favor progressive taxation tend to be signifi-
cantly worried about the deficit, and conservatives and nonpoliticals tend
to be less worried than self-identiﬁed liberals. Using the subset of respon-
dents who believe the deficit should be reduced, the authors estimate two
probit models. One accounts for the view that higher taxes should be part
of the solution, and the other for the view that the solution should include
spending cuts. Although the signs on the income variable are consistent
with self-interest having an influence, the variable is not significant in
either regression. Ideology does matter, however. The belief that taxes are
too high is significantly negatively related to support for raising taxes,
and the belief that taxes are too low is significantly negatively related to
support for cutting spending (as is self-identiﬁcation as liberal). 
Results of binary probit regressions for attitudes toward the minimum
wage are generally as one would expect. Significant support for a higher
minimum wage is found among those with lower incomes, the least edu-
cated, women, and blacks, as well as among respondents who knew at least
approximately the current value of the minimum wage. Resistance to an
increase is significant among those who believe a higher minimum wage
costs jobs. Thus, on this issue, self-interest, economic beliefs, and knowl-
edge all appear to be strong inﬂuences on opinion. 
Turning to Social Security, the authors include as additional self-
interest variables whether the respondent’s parents are alive, and how
important the respondent expects Social Security to be as a source of his or
her own retirement income. The latter variable is significant in all the
Social Security regressions. An ordered probit regression on whether
respondents favor President Bush’s proposal to introduce personal invest-
ment accounts within Social Security ﬁnds signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcients
on being conservative, having more education, and being Hispanic. Oppo-
sition to personal accounts is significant among liberals and those who
consider Social Security of at least some importance as a source of their
future retirement income. Thus both ideology and self-interest matter, but
neither general knowledge nor specific knowledge about the Bush pro-
posal, the size of present beneﬁts, or the Social Security deﬁcit was a sig-
nificant determinant of opinion. To analyze opinions on whether future
Social Security deficits should be dealt with by raising payroll taxes, cut-
ting benefits, or both, the authors use ordered probit regressions similar
to those used for analyzing opinions on the overall budget deficit. The
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ogy nor self-interest variables proving significant. There is opposition to
cutting beneﬁts among those who were aware of Bush’s privatization pro-
posal and among women and students. 
The authors’last two reported regressions analyze opinions on health
care. A binary probit model explaining whether or not respondents favor
universal health coverage ﬁnds signiﬁcant opposition from higher-income
people, conservatives, and self-reported voters, but significant support
from liberals and those who accurately estimated the share of the popula-
tion that is presently uninsured. No other variable—neither any demo-
graphic variable nor one that indicated whether a family member was
uninsured—was signiﬁcant. Finally, a regression explaining support for a
prescription drug benefit for Medicare found that blacks and more-
educated people do not support adding such a beneﬁt, whereas students do.
Other demographic factors, ideology, and knowledge do not matter. 
As a broad generalization of their findings, Blinder and Krueger con-
clude that ideology plays a stronger role in shaping public opinion on
economic policy issues than either self-interest or general knowledge. This
implies that their typical respondent differs markedly from the well-
informed, nonideological, and extremely self-interested homo economicus,
the representative agent assumed in most economic modeling. They see
their findings as more consistent with the political science view that peo-
ple use ideology in deciding what position to take when information is
scarce. And they speculate that either confusion or, in some instances, gen-
erosity of spirit may help explain such behavior.
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